



The Nature of Cross-Border Contraband Trade across the Main Route of Moyale - Hawassa

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Abstract

Globally and specifically in Africa, governments' major revenues, and the countries' peace and security, are being highly challenged by the very increasing nature of illegal and informal cross border trade. As a result, the issue of contraband is attracting both the academics and practitioners. It is with this reality that this study stood with the general objective of assessing the nature of cross-border contraband trade across the main route from Moyale (border town between Ethiopia and Kenya) to Hawassa (the capital of Ethiopian Southern region). To this end, the study has utilized exploratory and descriptive designs utilizing both primary and secondary data sources. As instruments of data collection Observation, Key informant interviews and review of organizational documents were utilized to feed the paper. In addition a total of 55 key informants were purposively targeted except contrabandists who were selected through snowball sampling. Moreover, in line with the design, a descriptive method of analyses has been utilized. Finally, the study indicated that contraband trade being carried out across the main route from Moyale to Hawassa takes different forms, and techniques of passing check points like bribing customs and security personnel, building extra hiding place (shag) in vehicles, passing stations via journeys in jungle and informal roads are most widely utilized. Moreover the dominant commodities smuggled are textile and foot wares and electronics. Hence, the authors recommend that synergy approach must be best utilized by multiple actors and concerned bodies to assess the causes and consequences of contraband trading and broader and comprehensive policy framework ought to be developed towards overcoming the problem.

Key Words: Contraband, Cross-border, Customs, Smuggling, Chain of Supply

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Introduction

Illegal cross-border trade is an organized activity, involving both business and criminal activities, characterized by the importation or exportation of goods and services by unlawful means as well as evasion of taxes with an objective of making more profit within a short period

of time (Jibril, 2014). It is defined by Economic Forum as 'money, goods or value gained from illegal and generally unethical activity' which generates 'economic, social, environmental or political harms' (World Economic Forum, 2012).

In the African context, intra-African trade flows for the past 30 or more years have

been low and full of discrepancies (Berg, 1985). Due to this the official intra-African trade accounts for only about 10% of total African exports and imports (Keane et al., 2010). While the observation in individual African countries revealed that, informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is thriving, almost everywhere, and serving as a source of income to about 43 % of Africa's population (Jean-Guy and Ajumbo, 2012).

According to the findings of various scientific studies cross-border contraband trade (CBCT) is thriving almost everywhere in Africa, and contributing to the loss of many governments' revenues. For instance, a study by Titeca (2009) and Habtamu et al., (2012) disclosed that illegal cross border trade has multiple impacts and there are variety of typologies of CBCT in East Africa. Moreover, the studies clearly put that the volume of contraband trade and the techniques of passing custom check points used by the smugglers vary from country to country. Practically speaking, there are frequently changing techniques of passing custom stations ranging from a simple check point avoidance by walking through informal roads up to the most organized and armed mobility of contrabandists (Titeca, 2009; Habtamu et al., 2012).

Particularly, Informal Cross Border Trade (ICBT) in Eastern Africa is more discernible when compared to other parts of the continent (Jean-Guy and Ajumbo, 2012). For instance, the recent recorded data show' that hundreds of thousands of all types of livestock and bulk of coffee, vegetables and *chat* originating from Ethiopia are smuggled to neighboring countries. In return, a wide range of manufactured goods is imported to the country illegally (ibid). Out of the outlets available to the illegal cross border trade, the *Moyale to Hawasa* route is the major one. The main highway from Moyale (a border town between Ethiopian and Kenya) and Hawassa (the capital of Southern Nation and Nationality People Reginal State) has a direct connection with a territorial border with Kenya and Somalia, and there are about six politically and economically important towns across this road.

In Ethiopian context, the country's Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP I) sought to strengthen the tax collection and administration systems to increase domestic revenue substantially as one of the economic development strategy (GTP-MoFD, 2010). The subsequent GTP II has also given due attention for the revenue and customs sector, and planned to increase the share of tax revenue to the total GDP to 17 percent so that budget deficit would be narrowed

down to 3% or less (GTP 2-MoFD, 2015). By the same token, Ethiopia ambition of becoming a middle income state by 2025 requires a substantial rise in domestic revenue from tax and non-tax sources. Contrary to this fact the Federal Customs and Revenue Authority (2010) disclosed that Ethiopia loses 16.2% of tax revenue per year due to illicit trade.

In Ethiopia, notwithstanding the recent explosion of plans, government’s commitment and reports with regard to the contraband and custom break, knowledge gaps still remain. At least as far as the researchers are concerned, little has been done to study the nature of cross-border contraband trade at national level and in the study area specifically. Hence, assessing issues pertaining to regional CBCT systems holds significant policy implications. Besides new questions and concerns are emerging in this regard, and there seems to

be a dearth of scientific studies. Therefore, this study will be undertaken to fill this gaps by searching for answers for the questions like; what are the dominant commodities smuggled in the area? What are the techniques of passing custom check points used by the smugglers? What are the types of contraband business in the area?

Materials and Methods

To carry out this research and achieve the objectives, qualitative research approach has been used with little back up from quantified data. Besides, since little was researched about the nature of cross border contraband trade in the study area, an exploratory descriptive study is found to be appropriate. Towards this end both primary and secondary data sources were utilized. While instrumentally, key informant interview, observation and review of organizational documents.

Table 1: Sampled informants in each town

No	Towns	Key informants				
		Customs officials	Legal business	Contrabandists (current and ex)	Town administration	Security officers
1	Hawassa	3	3	3 (2 ex)	1	1
2	Dilla	-	3	3 (2 ex)	1	-
3	Bulle-hor	2	3	4 (2 ex)	1	1
4	Yabello	1	3	4 (1 ex)	1	1
5	Moyalle	3	3	6 (1 ex)	1	2
Total		10	15	20 (7 ex)	5	5

Here, in all the cases purposive sampling technique was applied to target the respondents except X-contrabandists and current contraband operators. X-

contrabandists and current contraband operators were selected by using snow ball sampling technique, because there was no formal structure for identifying them. Moreover, in line with the design, a descriptive method of analyses has been utilized mostly by narrating and describing the meanings and implications has with some quantification involving tables, graphs and percentages.

Result and Discussion

Contraband: Context in Ethiopia

Contraband has been defined by numerous treaties, governments, and institutions in different ways based on the context of usage. For instance, Seid (2012) defined Illegal Cross Border Trade (contraband) as the importation or exportation of goods and services by unlawful means as well as evasion of taxes with an objective of making more profit within a short period of time (Seid, 2012). While, Ethiopian Customs Authority (as described by officials) also defined contraband as any kind of illegal and unlawful cross border trade (importation or exportation), where, the trade carries either goods with limitations or goods fully prohibited by legislation or goods not fulfilling the customs authorities requirements (taxes and duties). Hence, despite the availability of many definitions, the common ideas under

the definitions are: the prevalence illegality and unlawfulness in terms of the process and the goods in business.

According to Ethiopian Government reports, the country is achieving encouraging development results, and the country has an ambition of becoming a middle income state by 2025. Ethiopia recently launched a set of coordinated comprehensive development plan called the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) I and II. The first phase of the plan, which lasted for five years from 2010/11 to 2014/15, has come to a conclusion a year ago, leading to the kick-off of the second phase as of 2015/16 budget year. Though these coordinated plans are bringing about remarkable improvements, there are multiple hindrances impeding the progress of change and efforts on the pipeline. Out of the hindrances illegal cross border trade (contraband) is one and the major. Because the country is losing close to 17 percent her total budget by illegal trade. Moreover, it challenges both the local and foreign trade, and affects trade and investments activities (RCAP, 2014).

Furthermore, illegal cross border trade makes goods with restrictions and impositions to be exported to foreign countries, and contributes for increasing nature of inflationary scenarios in the

country. In turn, this is contributing to the fluctuating (unhealthy) business nature by importing illegal products and availing products in the market. And, lastly it is challenging the peace and security of the country by becoming the source of fund and firearms for anti-peace activists. Hence, as Southern Ethiopia has many outlets to Inter and Itra- regional boundaries, the condition is conducive for contraband trade and needs to be managed properly; otherwise, it exacerbates the level of poverty and inequality (ibid).

Types of Contraband along the Route

A) Based on the direction of trade

In Ethiopia, especially in Southern part, there are two types of contraband trade based on the direction (from where to where) of trade.

Exported Contraband Trade: this type of trade is a trade where either locally produced products and exclusively indigenous goods or previously preciously imported from other countries would be re-exported to other countries illegally and reduces the foreign exchange level that the country can obtain. On the other hand, legally protected and limited products would be exported and exacerbates the level of market fluctuation and inequalities -where very few will be benefited and the majority would be affected. This includes goods and products like; livestock's;

sheep's, goats, consumable crops like *Teff*, *vegetables*, *forest* and *forests'* product, oil products, wild animals and wild animals product, Industry's product like sugar, construction materials, cements, shoes, coffee, chat, gold, gas oil. Specifically in Southern Ethiopia products like Coffee, Chat, and leather and leather's output are highly dominating the products being exported to other countries.

Imported Contraband Trade: This trade is known by importing either prohibited products, under quality products/below the standards, or products evading customs authority's requirements, and having an impact up on the health, economy and politics of the country. This imported items includes; electronics, food and beverage, used cloths and shoes, cosmetics, medicines -human and animal, vehicles' spare parts, cigarettes, gold and other jewelries, firearms and the like.

B) Based on the Types of Goods Traded

Tax-evaded-Goods: one of the types of contraband which is mostly carried out with the legal goods but evaded tax or not fulfilling the process set by customs authority.

Quoted-Goods: This is also a contraband business with legal goods/permitted products but a product with limited quantity to be imported to the country. Since it is impossible to import the goods with high

quantity through formal way, the contrabandists import the product through the informal way.

Prohibited Goods: These products are like firearms, Drug, Narcotics, and etc. Thus, this type of contraband is a contraband trading nationally and internationally prohibited goods. There are legislations and provisions nationally and internationally, for some products not to be traded both formally and informally.

C) Based on the category of the contrabandists

Here the base of classification is forwarded by OCED (2009) and it focuses on the business operators and the nature of their

activity. Accordingly, there are three types of contrabandists. These are *unregistered traders* operating entirely outside of the formal economy, *registered traders* fully evading tax and other regulations and *registered traders/firms* who partly participate in smuggling and unlawful business.

Based on the field observation and the key informant interviews result, this study found out that all the three types of contrabandists are there in the study area. Among the three, the dominant ones are (in number) the unregistered traders who are entirely outside the formal economy.




Figure 1: Types of Informal Cross-Border Traders

Source: Adopted from OECD trade policy working paper (2009) cited in Jean-Guy K. Afrika and Gerald Ajumbo (2012)

Commodities Smuggled

The following table and the subsequent column charts depicts; the check point and

the volume of sized items, and volume of sized item as it is cross tabulated with the type of items and reporting check points.

Table 2: Seized Import and Export Contraband with Respective Check-Points



No	Respective Ch/points	Amount in Ethiopian Birr			
		2016		(July, 2016-Sept, 2017)	
		Imported	Exported	Imported	Exported
1	Moyale	41,706,279	2,402,945	8,844,812	163,800
2	Yabello	18,449,230	32,366	4,005,156	-
3	Bule Hora	16,699,525	1,463,200	2,289,890	-
4	Aposto	6,656,860	-	12,432,856	-
Total		83,511,894	3,898,511	27,572,714	

The above data depicts the tabular and graphical presentation of the volume of sized import and export contraband merchandizes as they are officially estimated in birr (ETB). Accordingly, in terms of imported contraband items in 2008 EC, the *Moyale* check-point constitutes the lion share (41,706,279 birr or close to 50 percent) of the total sized merchandizes. Similarly the *Yabelo*, *Bulehora* and *Aposto* check points accounts for 18,449,230 birr, 16,699,525 birr and 6,656,860 birr ranking 2nd, 3rd and 4th respectively. With regard to the first quarter of 2009 fiscal year, the trend of sized item distribution is almost similar with that of 2008 except the great superiority of the *Aposto* check point in sized contraband item with 12,432,856 birr (32 percent) of the total, followed by the *Moyale*, *Yabelo* and *Bulehora* custom satiations.

According to the key informants at the *Hawassa* and *Moyale* ERCA branch offices, in almost every year the *Moyale*, *Bulehora*, *Yabelo* and *Aposto* check points are ranked 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respectively. The subsequent probing of the informants confirmed that the unusual superiority of the *Aposto* check point over the others in the first quarter of 2009 Ethiopian fiscal year was due to the security problem in the area whereby the *Moyale*, *Yabelo* and *Bulehora* check points were not properly functioning for certain period. From the above data it can be generalized that, as the location of the check points is closer to the Ethio-Kenyan border, the volume of sized import items increases whereas as the location of the check points is closer to the heart of the country obviously the reverse is found to be true.

Regarding the sized export contraband in 2016, the *Moyale* (2,402,945 birr), *Bulehora* (1,463,200 birr) and *Yabelo*

(32,366 birr) check points are ranked 1st, 2nd and 3rd with 61.5 percent, 37.5 percent and less than 1 percent of the total respectively. However, there is no significant amount of sized export contraband in the first quarter of 2009 Ethiopian fiscal year. Here based on the volume of sized export items and the location of check points, it can be safely concluded that the volume is relatively higher on those borderline check points. Though this can be explained by multitude of factors, the most important of all is the difficulty of monitoring and indentifying export contraband items in those check points away from the countries border. Because the commodities are commonly smuggled form, one part of the country to

the other by using legal pity trade licenses as a cover.

One of the variables in the nature of cross border contraband trade (as stated in the introductory part of this article), is finding out the dominant commodities smuggled. Based on this the official documents were examined and presented in the above table (Table 2). Accordingly, in 2008 EFY, the highest proportion of the sized import contraband item in all custom check points was found to be shoes and clothes including both brand new and second hand followed by electronics (TV, mobile phones, solar etc) and Vehicle and spare parts.

Table 3: Import contraband by trading items and reporting check points

No	Items	2008 EC			2009 1 st Quarter (Jul 01/2008EC-Sep 30/2009 EC)		
		Moyale	Yabello	B/Hora	Moyale	Yabello	B/Hora
1	Electronics	4,999,800	3,392,395	1,905,600	1,212,700	1,754,100	167,900
2	Food and Beverage	823,551	140,650	1,234,200	502,213	148,080	87,000
5	Shoes and clothes	27,533,670	12,133,659	9,959,407	5,266,540	1,431,966	1,788,135
6	Cosmetics	738,045	155,909	170,085	171,680	10,280	36,100
7	Medicines	213,710	477,550	38,600	576,851	77,090	4,950
8	Vehicle and Spare- parts	3,479,096	720,000	2,752,643	40,000	150,000	140,000
12	Drug and Narcotics	36,000	1,800	-	300	-	-
10	Other Goods	3,882,406	1,427,267	638,990	1,074,528	433,640	65,805

The remaining smaller proportions is shared among others, food and beverage, cosmetics and medicine. Here, the data illustrates the dominated commodities

smuggled through contraband trade in to the country are textile and footwear followed by Electronics (see fig 2 for details).






Figure 2: 2008 Ethiopian fiscal year sized import contraband with respective reporting check points

In this regard key informants (branch office directors and expertise) also confirmed that due to local demand and the significant price difference between the smuggled items and the legal ones, textile, footwear and electronics took the highest share.

Moreover, as it can be seen in the following figure the story in the first quarter of 2009 Ethiopian fiscal year is not significantly different. Hence, it simply substantiates the above claim (*Graph 3*)




Figure 3: Import contraband with respective checkpoint (2017)



Techniques of Passing Check Points

Bribing: - Bribing is one of the systems used by contrabandists to pass chalk points with illicit items along *Moyale* to *Hawasa* checkpoints. It is the way of passing the check points by giving some amount of money to the check point officers or by means of share-Business making. As per the key informants interviewed, if, their agreement with check point officers is in cash, minimum of 2000 birr is given to the check point

Officers. For instance, if there are five contrabandists in the same public bus they give minimum of 2000 birr to check point officers, and 100-300 birr for assistant drivers. This 2000 birr is to be paid by contrabandists by share-pay principle (shared among contrabandists). After receiving the money the officers make fake inspections so that permits the crossing of the check points

In words on one of the informant, contrabandists targeted using snowball technique:

Case 1

"Look right now we are going to be inspected by check point officers. But, the inspection is would be entirely fake, because we have already given them 2000 birr to pass the checkpoint."

On the other hand, if the check point officers and the contrabandists have a share business agreement, the officers

would keep silent and leave them to cross the check point. Then, the contrabandists would sale the product and share the profit of goods sold

Case 2

"Mr. X (the check point officer) is my best friend for the last three years. I always come when the check point is his turn. Hence, in addition to mine, I always bring 10-15 pieces of shoes for him and the profit of those shoes will be for him (check point officer) "

Using Motor Cycle: In this case the contrabandists' use of a public transport up to the check point, and when they approach the check point (2-5 kilometers away from the stations) they drop all their products from the public bus and use Motor cycle to cross the check point via informal

(secondary) roads. After passing the check points the motor bicyclers would bring their product to the major road to 2-3 kilometers after the check point. Then the contrabandists would take their product again and use the same bus to move to the city they want.



Figure 4: use of motor cycle to cross check points

The above photos show that the contrabandists approaching the check point have given their goods to the motor bicycler and the bicycler is taking the informal road to pass the checkpoint. According to the informants the average

payment for motor bicyclers to pass the cheek point is 300-500 birr. The technique of passing the checkpoints through motor bicycle is best described in the following diagrams.




Figure 5: Illustration of the motor bike route

Using NGO and Government Vehicles: As a matter of trend, governmental and non-governmental organization vehicles are believed to be free of illegal acts and not participative in such unlawful activity.

Thus, most of the time, they are given with less consideration on the checkpoint areas, and inspection made for them is softer than other vehicles. This is due to the fact that they either belong to government or civil

society organizations and less suspected by officials. In contrary to the faith rested up on them, these vehicles have been used to make illegal business. The interview made with check point officers has shown that the vehicles are being used by contrabandists in two ways. Firstly, some of the experts and drivers who travel for frequent field works in the area participate in contraband business- they make the business by themselves. As they always travel around the areas, they used their frequency of travel to handle small amount of products and pass the checkpoints and sale it to small business holders (mostly their customers). Hence, workers, mostly drivers of the vehicles, are the participant of the business. Secondly, the workers do not directly involve themselves in the business but, they use the faith rested up on them and receive rent (fee) for vehicles and help the contrabandists to cross the checkpoints.

Distributing illicit items to Passengers: In this mechanism the contrabandists use public transportation to cross the check point, and they beg passengers to handle one or two items of goods they have at hand. For instance, if a contrabandist has ten leather jackets, he/she would distribute these jackets to their neighboring passengers. And they re-take it when they reach their destination.

Hiding in the Vehicles: In this system, it is simply hiding goods within the normal body of the vehicle like; Vehicle's box, at the head of the vehicle with other materials, under the seats and etc. Hence, in this case mainly the agreement is among the three agents (driver, assistant driver, and contrabandists). Dividing their materials in to different parts, and putting it in to different places they pass the checkpoints. For both driver and assistant driver, based on the amount of the goods loaded 200-1000 would be paid. These contrabandists mostly reach the check points at 4-6 LT during night, 9-11 LT during night and 4.30-7:30 LT during lunch time. This is because of the fact that during the night and the lunch time, officers become exhausted and softer inspection is common.

Journey in Forest and Informal Road: This technique is, not fully, but most widely used by the so called *big contrabandists*. Big contrabandists are contrabandists with their own vehicles, carry huge amount of goods, and known by their armed nature. Hence, they use the informal/rural road and if the security officers come to attack them or seize them, they never keep silent as any ordinary contrabandists, rather they use any options seen to be best to defend themselves.

Shag- Out of the systems used by contrabandists, *Shag* is the most systematic

one. In this system, contrabandists are either vehicle owners or make a business in agreement with the owners of vehicles. It is a system of passing check points by intentionally creating extra body for the vehicle (internally or externally) or using any internal and hidden part of the vehicle.



Figure 6: Using shag to hide illicit items

(Photo credit- the research team 2017)¹

Using Pack Animals: there are two scenarios in which this method is used. Firstly and mostly, animal transportation is used to cross the border (Ethio-Kenya).

Some contrabandists create extra body under vehicle's sits, some others use oil tanker while others add another container up on the existing body of vehicles. The following are some of the 'shag' practices seized at different checkpoints.

After buying all the goods they desire from *Gambo* (Market in Kenya), they communicate with the owners of pack animals (mostly donkey) so that they cross from Kenya to Ethiopia. Secondly, some times in the absence of motor bicycle or in case of inconvenience to motor bicycle, pack animal (donkey) transportation is utilized by contrabandists to pass the checkpoints.

Kinship Networks: This system is only used by contrabandists to cross Ethio-Kenyan border. There are number of Somali's women who win their daily bread by giving "transportation service. This is due to the fact that the informal road crossing the border (Ethio-Kenyan border) meets Somali Regional State's border from Ethiopia's side. Thus, Somali's police officers are responsible to control the flow of goods from Kenya to Ethiopia. Accordingly, as the Women used for this

¹ -The 1st picture is a sized lorry at *Yabelo* CRA warehouse. The driver was caught caring more than 500 smart phones inside the fuel tank. Here the fuel tank was divided in to two parts where in the first partition obviously fuel is loaded but in the other half

the contraband phones were loaded. According to the informants the partitions are commonly made in professional garages in such a way there would be no leakage.

purposes ethnically belong to the same group with police officers acting as checkpoint officers, and the women are the beneficiaries of the transportation payment, Somali's police officers compromise the transition of goods and keep silent taking some amount of bribe for the goods transported too.

Using Local Trading Licenses to Export:

According to the key informants at the Moyale ECRA branch office; there are cases where legal Ethiopian merchants manipulate their legality to export crops and serials to Kenya. While some others, receive a license for locally manufactured and legal products but make business with contraband products. Thus, exportable

contraband is mostly done either with the manipulation of legal license or using local politics (ethnic networks) as a means.

Chains of Contraband from Mayale to Hawasa:

Based on the chains of users and business makers from *Gambo* (kenya) to *Hawasa*, the contraband business takes three forms like *Gambo-Moyale*, directly *Gambo-Moyale-Hawas*, and *Gambo-Moyale- Yabello-Bulehora-Dilla-Hawasa*

Gambo-Moyale- In this case business makers are mostly from *moyale* and its surrounding areas. Thus, contrabandists purchase items from *Gambo* and cross to Ethiopian *Moyale* and distribute and sale it to the users of the town or diffuse to the local areas surrounding Moyale




Figure 7: Schematic presentation of the Gambo-Moyale chain

Gambo-Moyale -Hawasa- Here, after the goods are purchased from *Gambo* and smuggled to Ethiopian *Moylae*, the contrabandists use the informal road or bribed formal ones to directly reach

Hawasa. This type of chain is mostly used by big contrabandists where they use their own vehicles to cross the check points loading huge amounts of merchandize.




Fig 8: Schematic presentation of the Gambo-Hawassa chain

Gambo-Moyale-Diffusion: In this case the contrabandists purchase from *Gambo* and cross Ethio-Kenyan border, and then start their journey from *Moyale*. These contrabandists at *Moyale* have got business

linkage and partners in these towns. Thus they drop certain volume of their luggage to their respective partners in the towns across the route till the final point in Addis.




Figure 9: Schematic presentation of Gambo-Moyale Chail

Conclusion

In this article, an attempt was made to enquire the nature of cross border contraband trade across the main route from *Moyale* to *Hawassa*. To this end a special emphasis was made on the dominant commodities smuggled, the techniques of passing custom check points used by the smugglers, the chain of supply and consumption patterns. The study found out that the dominant import contraband items across the route are textile and foot wares (brand new and used) and electronics ranked first and second based on the volume of sized items as officially estimated in Ethiopian birr. These items are followed by vehicles and spares parts and food and beverage ranking 3rd and 4th respectively.

Concerning the correlation of customs check points location with the volume of sized import and export contrabands the article generalized that, as the location of the check points is closer to the Ethio- Kenyan border the volume of sized import items increases whereas as the location of the check points is closer to the heart of the country obviously the reverse is found to be true. On the other hand, with regard the volume of sized export items and the location of check points, the volume is relatively

higher on those borderline check points. This is mainly because the items are commonly smuggled from one part of the country to the other by using legal pity trade licenses as a cover. Hence the feasible way to detect the smuggling is around the international border.

With regard to the techniques of passing checkpoints, there are multiple and frequently changing techniques. Those contrabandists who do the business for subsistence usually distribute items to passengers in public transports or travel through jungle and informal roads risking their life. On the other hand the *giant* contrabandists (with lots of networks, capital and firearm); utilize techniques like using NGO and Government vehicles that are less suspicious, bribing customs and security officials and using local trading licenses. To transport the commodities pack animals, motorcycles, and hiding in vehicle parts and building extra hiding place (called *Shag*) in vehicles are the commonly used means. In addition this article also found out the chain of supply, consumption and diffusions patterns of contraband items across the main route under investigation. consequently, three dominant chains of supply are indentified in the study namely the *Gambo-Moyalle*, the *Gambo-*



Moyalle-Hawassa and the Gambo- Moyalle-Diffusion.

Recommendations

On the basis of the findings and conclusions reached, the following recommendations are forwarded.

One of the techniques of passing check points used by the smugglers is bribing and using their kinship networks with custom and security officers. Hence, ECRA and regional and local governments should introduce strict ethical code and counter corruption strategies.

The site and location of custom check points was selected many years ago. Nowadays several rural roads and pass ways are developed. Hence, evidence based study should be made to relocate check points or build additional stations where ever appropriate and feasible.

Co-ordination among stakeholders is a decisive factor that determines the success of any counter contraband effort. Co-planning, co-implementation and co-evaluation should be attempted among ECRA, regional governments, local governments, Federal and regional police, intelligence and surveillance

units of the government. After all synergetic effort will eventually payoff.


There are gray areas about the causes and consequences of CBCT in the area. Further scholarship and studies should be carried out on the causes, attitude and consequences of cross border contraband trade across the study area.

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